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Abstract
We have analyzed the eect of a pension system on life expectancy and happiness level using a cross country data and
an optimal dynamic problem of individuals who live in continuous and finite time. From the data and the optimization
problem, we have found the following; 1) happiness can be almost explained by income per capita, 2) depending on
the level of income per capita, the pension system can make lifespan longer or shorter and can raise or reduce the level
of happiness, 3) the extension of lifespan without the income support may not always make our happiness higher, 4)
under government budget constraint, even though pension system can make the lifespan longer, pension system cannot
make the happiness level higher and can rather raise problems for aging population. The public pension system, which
is a compulsory saving, can crowd out the private savings and can prevent individual’s utility maximization. This paper
suggests that it is not always true that the pension system improves happiness level and that it may be necessary for
us to reconsider about the reason for existence of the compulsory pension.
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1. Introduction
Believe it or not, according to an anecdote in Eu-
rope, as soon as a pension system was introduced, the
number of people who jog in the park for their health
increased. If we have a pension system, it looks like a
good deal, if we live long enough to enjoy in pension.
This research analyzes the eect of a pension system
on life expectancy and happiness level. Especially, this
research will oer answers to the following questions.
Could pension system make us happier? Could pension
system make our lifespan longer? Is it always true that
longevity ensures happiness? Which one is better, we
plan our own future by ourselves or we rely on govern-
ment pension system? and so on.
There are many literatures on the eect of rising
longevity on some economic variables as saving rate,
growth rate, labor market, education, and so on. For ex-
ample, Bloom et al. (2007) and Dushi et al. (2010),
Lee et al. (2000) examine the eects of improve-
ments in health or life expectancy on social security
system and saving rate. Weil (2007), Acemoglu and
Johnson (2007), Zhang and Zhang (2004), Zhang et
al. (2001), and so on, analyze the eects of improve-
ments in health or life expectancy on economic growth.
Zhang et al. (2003) shows that rising longevity encour-
ages both savings and earlier retirement. Gorski et al.
(2007) studies the eects of a pension reform on the ed-
ucational level of the economy. Pecchenino and Uten-
dorf (1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), Cipriani
(2000), Boucekkine, et al. (2002, 2003), Pecchenino
and Pollard (1997, 2002), and so on, analyze the ef-
fect of longer lifespan on economic growth through
the level of schooling and human capital accumulation.
Lorentzen et al. (2008) and Chakraborty et al. (2010),
and so on, analyze the eect of mortality and disease
on economic growth and growth trap. Lorentzen et al.
(2008) mentions that higher adult mortality has bad in-
fluences on economic growth and could be the source
of a poverty trap through increased levels of risky be-
havior, higher fertility, and lower investment in phys-
ical and human capital. Recently, Pestieau and Pon-
thiere (2012) surveys the various contributions to the
impact of changes in longevity on various public poli-
cies. However, there is little research on the opposite di-
rection, that is, how economic variables, except income
per capita, aect life expectancy or health. This research
is dierent from previous researches in the fact that a
pension system is the cause, and the life expectancy and
the happiness level are its eects.
A vast amount of empirical and theoretical re-
searches about the economic welfare of a pension sys-
tem has been accumulated. The main results of some
previous studies on pension system and economic wel-
fare can be summarized as follows: under a fully funded
system, the economic welfare is not aected, however,
under a pay-as-you-go pension system, depending on
the economic situations and generations, the economic
welfare might be both improved or worsened. The
public pension system as a risk-hedging device can in-
crease welfare by providing a certainty in the imper-
fect market, e.g., Shiller (1999), Krueger and Kubler
(2002), Sa´nchez-Marcos and Sa´nchez-Martin (2006),
Bohn (2009), etc. The compulsory pension system
which is one of the forced saving policies can lead to
high saving rates, meanwhile, the public pension system
crowds out the private savings. The pension system can
have a negative eect on the capital accumulation and
can retard growth, e.g., Cutler and Gruber (1996), Feld-
stein and Liebman (2002), Zhang and Zhang (2004),
etc. The overall welfare impact depends on the balance
between the insurance eect and the crowding-out ef-
fect. In this research, we show that the pension system
has both positive and negative eect on welfare using a
cross country data. More specifically, the pension sys-
tem has a positive eect on welfare when income per
capita is low, but the pension system has a negative ef-
fect on welfare when income per capita is high.
Many previous researches analyze economic wel-
fare using overlapping generation models. We use an
optimal dynamic problem of individuals who live in
continuous time, instead of discrete time which has
been used in the overlapping generation models, e.g.,
Chakraborty (2004), Sa´nchez-Marcos and Sa´nchez-
Martin (2006), Ponthiere (2009), etc. This is one of
the dierences of this research model from the previ-
ous models. To tell more specifics, in many previous
overlapping generation models, the maximum lifespan
has been given (e.g., two-period or three-period) and
the survival probability has been introduced and the life
expectancy has been calculated by the average of the
longevity of the people who live to the maximum lifes-
pan and the people who die before the maximum lifes-
pan depending on the survival probability. Actually, in
two-period model, only two kinds of ages (i.e., one-
period-old and two-period-old) exist and nobody sur-
vives more than the given period even though the life
expectancy has variations. However, in this research
model, the individual decides about the time when
he/she will die, at the terminal point of the continuous
time model, to maximize his/her happiness level. We
consider that the individual’s longevity is based from the
result of the individual’s utility maximization problem.
Individuals could choose to live a short and intensely
2
happy life, or a longer and less intensely happy life, or a
so-so long and so-so happy life. For example, there are
many people who still smoke, even though they know
all of the health risks and there are so many warnings
and pictures showing the consequences on the cigarette
packets. We can interpret their behavior by saying that
they prefer some present pleasure from smoking, even
if smoking plays havoc with their health. It can be an
example of the first case, that is, they choose to live a
short and intensely happy life. If the length of life is
chosen optimally, the relationship of the length of life
and the level of happiness could not be proportional.
We consider a lifetime utility maximization problem
between the length of life and the level of happiness un-
der individual’s budget constraint. This means that the
individual’s longevity is an endogenous variable, not
exdogenous variable. An individual distributes his/her
budget to his/her basic needs and to his/her health in-
vestments to maximize his/her lifetime utility. Like
lifetime uncertainty models (e.g., Pecchenino and Pol-
lard (1997), Chakraborty (2004), Momota et al. (2005),
etc.), we assume that it is possible to extend lifespan by
the eort of an individual through health investments.
For example, eating good food, taking some nutritional
supplements, getting in shape by going to the gym, in-
vesting in the development of medical technology, and
so on. The longevity will arise due to the implementa-
tion of the previously mentioned examples of the health
investments. In reality, it is well known that coronary
heart disease (CHD) mortality is highly influenced by
the major risk factors, e.g., serum cholesterol, systolic
blood pressure, diabetes, smoking habits, high alcohol
consumption, lack of exercise and stress, etc. Lifestyle
changes through individual’s eorts (e.g., healthier diet,
physical exercise, cessation of smoking and drinking,
etc.) and medications have been shown to be eective
in reducing coronary disease. If we can eliminate the
risk factors, the life expectancy will undoubtedly grow.
We have investigated how the optimized lifespan
and the lifetime utility level have been changed by the
existence or non-existence of the pension system. We
have compared the lifetime utility level under the re-
striction of the pension system as a compulsory sav-
ing with the lifetime utility level without the restriction.
We have shown the following using the cross country
data: 1) Income per capita can almost explain happi-
ness. The positive correlation between life expectancy
and happiness is a spurious relationship in which two
variables have no direct causal connection. In reality,
the income per capita has caused both. And the lifes-
pan does not have much influence on happiness. 2) De-
pending on the level of income per capita, the pension
system can make lifespan longer or shorter. 3) Depend-
ing on the level of income per capita, the pension sys-
tem can raise or reduce the level of happiness. 4) Life
expectancy itself is not always proportional to the hap-
piness level. Moreover, we have shown following four
important results using this research model: i) Life ex-
pectancy is not always proportional to lifetime utility
level. ii) Pension system can make the lifespan longer
or shorter. The lifespan depends on the type of pension
system. iii) Under government budget constraint, even
though pension system can make the lifespan longer,
pension system cannot make the happiness level higher.
The pension system can rather raise problems for aging
population which aect the country’s productivity and
growth rate negatively through the decline in the frac-
tion of working-age population.1 iv) If the prediction of
lifespan does not turn out to be completely wrong under
lifetime uncertainty, it is not always true that the pension
system improves the lifetime utility level.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 con-
firms the relationship among income per capita, exis-
tence or non-existence of pension system, happiness and
life expectancy using a cross country data. Section 3
presents a benchmark model and drives the benchmark
outcomes. Section 4 introduces a pension system to the
benchmark model and solves the models numerically
and analyzes the results. Section 5 introduces an uncer-
tainty in the benchmark model and analyzes the results.
Section 6 oers conclusions on this research. Finally,
more information on each country and the detailed cal-
culation can be found in Appendix.
2. Empirical Facts
2.1. Data
We have used data of GDP per capita, life ex-
pectancy and the existence or non-existence of a pen-
sion system as the determinants of happiness. Each of
the variables is thought to be the variable that looks at
an economic side, a biological side and a social system-
atic side to decide about the level of happiness, respec-
tively. We will clarify how a pension system influences
happiness using the data set. The data used in this re-
search can be easily downloaded on the internet. The
1The public pension system which is a compulsory saving can raise the national saving rate and the growth rate if it does not crowd out the
private savings.
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happiness index and the life expectancy are available at
World Database of Happiness and the GDP per capita is
also available at Penn World Table. The data of the exis-
tence or non-existence of a pension system are found in
Table 1 of Bloom et al. (2007). World Database of Hap-
piness had released the averages of the happiness index
from 2000 to 2009 and the averages of life expectancy
from 2000 to 2009 for 10 years. The range of the happi-
ness index is from 0 to 10. The GDP per capita has used
the variable “rgdpch” in Penn World Table 7.1. Accord-
ing to the Penn World Table 7.1, the variable “rgdpch”
is GDP per capita (chain series) converted using Pur-
chasing Power Parity (PPP), at 2005 constant prices.
We have calculated the average of GDP per capita from
2000 to 2009 to meet the happiness index and the life
expectancy in World Database of Happiness. We used
the logarithm scale for GDP per capita, in the follow-
ing analysis. The pension data, which are dummy vari-
able for the existence or non-existence of a pension sys-
tem, show the situation in 2002. The value of dummy
variable is one when the country has any pension sys-
tem and the value of dummy variable is zero when the
country does not have any pension system.2 Regarding
pension data, we have used the figures under the name
“Universal coverage” from the Table 1 of Bloom et al.
(2007). According to Bloom et al. (2007), the dummy
variable of “Universal coverage” indicates whether the
system covers all workers or not.
We have reported the detailed data source in Table
1. World Database of Happiness, Penn World Table 7.1
and the pension data in 2002 of Bloom et al. (2007)
listed 149, 190 and 61 countries, respectively. We focus
on the 61 countries which have all the three data sets.
Table 5 in the Appendix contains the basic information
of the 61 countries.
Fig. 1 plots the relationship between income per
capita and happiness, between life expectancy and hap-
piness, and between the existence or non-existence of
a pension system and happiness, visually. In Fig. 1,
each vertical axis shows the happiness level. os repre-
sent the countries that have pension system while on the
other side xs represent the countries that do not have
any pension system. It appears that all of the three cases
have positive relationships, between income per capita
and happiness, between life expectancy and happiness,
and between the existence or non-existence of a pen-
sion system and happiness, respectively. Each of the
coecients of correlation is r(income per capita, happi-
ness)=0.833, r(life expectancy, happiness)=0.788, and
r(pension system, happiness)=0.390. We have reported
the coecients of correlation in Table 2.
2.2. Regression Analysis
2.2.1. Happiness
We have investigated the relationships between hap-
piness and income per capita, between happiness and
life expectancy, and between happiness and pension
system, statistically. The happiness is treated as the de-
pendent variable. We denote the happiness level, the
income per capita, the life expectancy and the existence
or non-existence of a pension system as H, y, L and P,
respectively.
We use linear regression models as Eq. (1) to Eq.
(4). Eq. (1) has a single regressor, the income per capita
(y). Eq. (2) has two regressors, the income per capita (y)
and the life expectancy (L). And, Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)
also have two regressors, the income per capita (y) and
the existence or non-existence of a pension system (P).
We have estimated the variables using maximum likeli-
hood estimation (MLE). The maximum likelihood esti-
mation is a method to maximize the likelihood function
to estimate the variables. The subscripts, is represent
country i. We have assumed that each of the errors, is,
is identically distributed, independent random variable
with i  N(0; 2). Table 3 has reported the estimation
results of Eq. (1) to (4), respectively.
Hi = 0 + 1yi + i (1)
Hi = 0 + 1yi + 2Li + i (2)
Hi = 0 + 1yi + 2Pi + i (3)
Hi = (1   Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (4)
All of the 1s for the income per capita (y) in Eq.
(1), (2) and (3) are positive and significant, but the 2
in Eq. (2) for the life expectancy (L) and the 2 in
Eq. (3) for the existence or non-existence of a pension
system (P) are not significant, respectively.3 We know
that the happiness can be almost explained by the in-
come per capita, and additionally that, life expectancy
and pension system, do not aect the level of happi-
ness, significantly. Furthermore, we also know, from
the result of Eq. (4), that depending on the existence or
2There may be both superior and inferior pension systems depending on the countries. However, in this research, we have checked weather
there is a pension system or not. We will not consider about the quality of pension system.
3There are fewer countries without pension system. Only 13 countries out of 61 (21:3%) do not have their pension system which means 48
countries (78:7%) have it.
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Table 1: Data sources
Indicators Database Sources
Satisfaction
with life (Hap-
piness)
World Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Life ex-
pectancy
World Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Life ex-
pectancy at
birth, total
(years)
World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN
Happy life
years
World Database
of Happiness
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/
Per capita GDP Penn World Ta-
ble
https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/
Pension Bloom et al.
(2007)
Table 1, Social security systems: retirement and
pension provisions, page 105-108
*) The happy life years are calculated by the product of the satisfaction with life and the life expectancy.
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Figure 1: Income, life expectancy, pension system and happiness
non-existence of a pension system, the estimated values
of the intercept and the slope are quite dierent. The in-
tercept (0), where pension system exists, is bigger than
the intercept (0) where pension system does not exist.
0 < 0. The slope (1), where pension system exists, is
smaller than the slope (1) where pension system does
not exist. 1 > 1. It means that the eect of pension
system on the happiness is dierent depending on the
income level.
We visualize the regression results from Eq. (1) to
Eq. (4) in Fig. 2. Fig. 2 (1) shows regression lines
based on Eq. (1) and Eq. (4). By comparing the red
line (P = 0) and the blue line (P = 1), the slope of
the red line is steeper than that of the blue line. As the
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Table 2: Coecients of correlation
variables happiness GDP per capita life expectancy pension happy life years
happiness 1.000 0.833 0.788 0.390 0.961
GDP per capita 0.833 1.000 0.882 0.529 0.909
life expectancy 0.788 0.882 1.000 0.527 0.919
pension 0.390 0.529 0.527 1.000 0.467
happy life years 0.961 0.909 0.919 0.467 1.000
Table 3: Estimation results
Parameters Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
0 -0.756 -0.926 -0.904 -2.535
t value -1.229 -1.515 -1.422 -1.870
1 0.789 0.587 0.824 1.036
t value 11.747 4.204 10.476 5.941
2 - 0.028 -0.220 -
t value - 1.632 -0.852 -
0 - - - -0.632
t value - - - -0.768
1 - - - 0.772
t value - - - 8.922
 0.706 0.691 0.702 0.692
t value 11.047 11.045 11.045 11.045
log likelihood value -65.32 -64.02 -64.96 -64.05
reverse point 0 0
1 1 - - - 7.206
The upper and lower show the estimated values and t values, respectively.
income level increases, both lines cross each other and
the reverse of their positions occurs. We can find that
when the income per capita is low, the blue line is upper
than the red line, that is, the happiness is higher with the
pension system comparing to the one without the pen-
sion system, but when the income per capita is high, the
opposite occurs, which means that the red line is up-
per than the blue line, that is, the happiness is higher
without the pension system comparing to the one with
the pension system. The reverse point happens around
income per capita 1; 347 = exp(7:206) in 2005 value
which is small. It can be inferred that when income
level is low, the pension system makes people happier,
on the other hand, when income level is high, the pen-
sion systems make people less happy. The pension sys-
tem, which is a kind of the forced saving policies, can
prevent individuals from maximizing their utility which
is a measurement of their happiness. In other words,
even though we face uncertainty in our life so we do
not know when we will die exactly, the results suggest
that above certain level of income, we can be happier by
planning our own future and by optimizing our utility by
ourselves without any compulsory saving like pension
system.
In Fig. 2 (1), we have also drawn a black line which
is the regression line based on Eq. (1). And then, for
each country, we have measured the gap between the
country’s actual level of happiness and the level pre-
dicted by the regression line. Fig. 2 (2) shows the re-
lationship between the residual part of happiness and
the life expectancy. Because the happiness is almost ex-
plained by the income per capita, there is not high rela-
tionship between the residuals and the life expectancy.
The correlation coecient is only r=0.096. Fig. 2 (2)
means that the 2 of Eq. (2) is not significant as we have
seen.
Fig. 2 (3) shows the relationship between the resid-
uals of life expectancy regressed on the income per
6
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Figure 2: Income and happiness, and life expectancy and happiness
capita and the residuals of happiness regressed on the
income per capita. When the influence of income on the
life expectancy and the happiness is removed, the rela-
tionship between both variables, the controlled life ex-
pectancy and the controlled happiness, is not so strong,
only r=0.205.
From the results of Fig. 2 (2) and (3), we know that
the positive correlation between the life expectancy and
the happiness in Fig. 1 (2) is a spurious relationship.
Even if we can see positive relationship between longer
life expectancy and happiness, we now know that the
two variables have no direct causal connection and the
income per capita actually works behind the two vari-
ables, the life expectancy and the happiness. The in-
creasing lifespan without increasing income does not
necessarily increase happiness. Even though we may
not like to admit it, it unfortunately suggests that the sur-
vival itself is not always making our happiness and util-
ity high and the two of those combined make us happy.4
2.2.2. Life expectancy and happy life years
First, we have investigated the relationships between
the life expectancy and the income per capita, and be-
tween the life expectancy and the existence or non-
existence of a pension system. The life expectancy is
treated as the dependent variable. We have done re-
gression analysis using Eq. (5) to Eq. (7). Eq. (5)
has a single regressor, income per capita (y). Eq. (6)
and Eq. (7) have two regressors, income per capita (y)
and the existence or non-existence of a pension system
(P). We have estimated the variables by the maximum
likelihood estimation like as what we have done in the
Section 2.2.1.
Second, we also have investigated the relationships
between the happy life years (HL) and the income per
capita (y), and between the happy life years (HL) and
the pension system (P). The happy life year is treated
as the dependent variable. The happy life years are cal-
culated by the product of the level of happiness and the
life expectancy. We have done regression analysis using
Eq. (8) to Eq. (10). HLi represents the happy life year
in country i.
Li = 0 + 1yi + i (5)
Li = 0 + 1yi + 2Pi + i (6)
Li = (1   Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (7)
4Some researches have a dierent opinion about it, for example, Becker et al. (2005) shows that life expectancy gains have been an important
component of improvements in welfare which is also aected by quantity of life as represented by longevity. That may be the case in the situation
where their financial problems can be resolved.
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Table 4: Estimation results
Parameters Eq. (5) Eq. (6) Eq. (7) Eq. (8) Eq. (9) Eq. (10)
0 6.070 7.568 -17.126 -39.142 -39.587 -55.242
t value 1.351 1.638 -1.834 -7.683 -7.480 -4.921
1 7.183 6.825 10.034 9.458 9.565 11.599
t value 14.652 11.947 8.356 17.016 14.611 8.034
2 - 2.223 - - -0.663 -
t value - 1.183 - - -0.308 -
0 - - 17.240 - - -35.525
t value - - 3.043 - - -5.216
1 - - 6.036 - - 9.064
t value - - 10.131 - - 12.653
 5.156 5.097 4.762 5.845 5.841 5.726
t value 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045 11.045
log likelihood value -186.60 -185.91 -181.76 -194.26 -194.21 -193.00
reverse point 0 0
1 1 - - 8.596 - - 7.779
The upper and lower show the estimated values and t values, respectively.
HLi = 0 + 1yi + i (8)
HLi = 0 + 1yi + +2Pi + i (9)
HLi = (1   Pi)(0 + 1yi) + Pi(0 + 1yi) + i (10)
Table 4 shows the estimation results by Eq. (5) to
Eq. (10). The results in Table 4 are very similar to the
results obtained with the happiness which is the inde-
pendent variable in the Table 1. All of the 1s for in-
come per capita (y) are positive and significant, but all
of the 2s for the existence or non-existence of a pension
system (P) are not significant. From Eq. (6) and Eq.
(9), we know that because both the life expectancy and
the happy life year are almost explained by the income
per capita, the pension system itself has few explana-
tory power for both the life expectancy and the happy
life years. It means that the pension system itself cannot
extend the lifespan and the happy life years. We also
know, from Eq. (7) and Eq. (10), that depending on
the existence or non-existence of a pension system, the
intercept and the slope of the regression line are quite
dierent.
The intercept (0), where pension system exists, is
bigger than the intercept (0) where pension system
does not exist. 0 < 0. The slope (1), where pension
system exists, is smaller than the slope (1) where pen-
sion system does not exist. 1 > 1. It means that the
eects of pension system on the life expectancy and the
happy life years are dierent depending on the income
level.
We visualize the regression results in Fig. 3 which
shows regression lines. Fig. 3 (1) shows the relationship
between the income per capita and the life expectancy.
Fig. 3 (2) shows the relationship between the income
per capita and the happy life years. Fig. 3 shows that the
red regression lines without the pension system (P = 0)
are steeper than the blue regression lines with the pen-
sion system (P = 1). As the income level increases, both
lines cross each other and the reverse of their positions
occurs as we have seen at Fig. 2 (1).
We can find that when the income per capita is low,
the life expectancy and the happy life year are longer
with the pension system comparing to the one with-
out the pension system, otherwise, when the income per
capita is high, the life expectancy and the happy life year
are longer without the pension system comparing to the
one with the pension system. Each of the reverse points
of Eq. (7) and Eq. (10) happens around income per
capita 5; 410 = exp(8:596) and 2; 390 = exp(7:779), re-
spectively. Anyhow, the values are low. In the countries
with low income levels, both the life expectancy and the
happy life year are increased by the pension system, on
the other hand, in the countries with high income lev-
els, both the life expectancy and the happy life years
are decreased by the pension system. It suggests that
in the countries above certain level of income, the in-
dividual’s utility optimizations can be hampered by the
savings forced by the pension system.
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2.2.3. Nonparametric estimation
To loosen the assumption of linear relationship be-
tween the variables which we have assumed in the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 and the Section 2.2.2, we have estimated the
relationship by a nonparametric estimation which es-
timates the regression function without assuming any
specific form. f ()s in Eq. (11) to Eq. (17) are the un-
specified regression functions.
Each of the equations from Eq. (11) to Eq. (13) has
one regressor, the income per capita (y) and each of the
equations from Eq. (14) to Eq. (17) has two regressors,
the income per capita (y) and the pension system (P) or
the income per capita (y) and the life expectancy (L).
The dependent variables in Eq. (11) to Eq. (13) are the
happiness (H), the life expectancy (L) and the happy
life years (HL), respectively. The dependent variables
in Eq. (14) to Eq. (17) are the happiness (H), the hap-
piness (H), the life expectancy (L) and the happy life
years (HL), respectively.
Hi = f (yi) + i (11)
Li = f (yi) + i (12)
HLi = f (yi) + i (13)
Hi = f (yi; Pi) + i (14)
Hi = f (yi; Li) + i (15)
Li = f (yi; Pi) + i (16)
HLi = f (yi; Pi) + i (17)
Fig. 4 (1) to (3) are the regression results of Eq. (11)
to Eq. (13), respectively. The estimation results in Fig.
4 (1) to (3) are not much dierent to the results obtained
by assuming the linear relationship as before. Fig. 4 (1)
corresponds to Fig. 2 (1), and Fig. 4 (2) corresponds to
Fig. 3 (1), and Fig. 4 (3) corresponds to Fig. 3 (2). The
red lines (P = 0) without the pension system are steeper
than the blue lines (P = 1) with the pension system.
Because the equations from Eq. (14) to Eq. (17)
have two regressors and one dependent variable, we
cannot depict the regression results on two dimensional
space, so we depict the results using contour lines in Fig.
5.5 The contour line shows the same level of dependent
variable in the dierent combinations of two regressors.
For example, the contour lines in Fig. 5 (1) show the
same levels of happiness in the dierent combinations
of two regressors which are the income per capita and
the pension system.
Fig. 5 (1) shows that when the income per capita
5I have used the command “Tps” in R to estimate the nonparametric regression models.
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Figure 4: The results of nonparametric estimation with one regressor
is low, the contour lines are vertically-tilted. It means
that regardless the involvement of the pension system,
the level of happiness is almost the same. However, as
the income per capita increases, the contour lines are
no longer vertically-tilted. The contour lines begin to
turn clockwise. For example, point A where income
per capita which is 8.5 without the pension system and
point B where income per capita which is 10.0 with the
pension system have the same level of happiness, that
is, the two points, A and B, are connected with a con-
tour line where the same level of happiness is seven. In
other words, if the income levels are the same, the level
of happiness is higher when there is no pension system.
Fig. 5 (2) shows the happiness level in the dierent
combinations of the life expectancy and the income per
capita. We found that when the income per capita is low
(left-below side), the contour lines are downward-slop,
however, when the income per capita is high (right-
upper side), there is no a specific pattern. By comparing
the point C and the point D, which are densely-packed
with the data, both levels of the happiness are the same,
but the combinations of the income per capita and the
life expectancy are dierent. The point C is a combina-
tion of high income per capita and long life expectancy,
on the other hand, the point D is a combination of low
income per capita and short life expectancy. The short
life expectancy with less income is equivalent to the
long life expectancy with more income which means
the life expectancy itself is not always proportional to
the happiness.
Fig. 5 (3) shows the life expectancy in the dierent
combinations of the existence or non-existence of a pen-
sion system and the income per capita. We have found
that when the income per capita is low (left-below side),
the contour lines are downward-slop, however, as the in-
come per capita increases, the contour lines change al-
most vertically-tilted, slightly in a clockwise direction.
When the income per capita is low, the pension system
makes the life expectancy longer, however, when the in-
come per capita is high, the pension system is uninfluen-
tial or negative to the extension of the life expectancy.
This result is consistent with the regression results of
Eq. (6) and Eq. (7).
Fig. 5 (4) shows the happy life years in the dierent
combinations of the existence or non-existence of a pen-
sion system and the income per capita. We also found
that almost of the contour lines are vertically-tilted. This
means that the existence or non-existence of a pension
system does not aect to the happy life years. This re-
sult is consistent with the regression results of Eq. (9).
2.3. Summary
We have summarized some empirical factors which
are obtained by the usage of the regression analysis.
1. The level of happiness can be almost explained by
the income per capita. The relationships between
the happiness and the other variables, which are
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Figure 5: The results of nonparametric estimation with two regressors
the life expectancy and the pension system, are
spurious relationships. In reality, the income per
capita have caused both.
2. The pension system can make the life expectancy
longer or shorter depending on the level of in-
come per capita. However, in many cases, the
pension system may give bad eects on the ex-
tension of life expectancy.
3. When the level of income per capita is low, the
pension system makes the happiness higher, on
the contrary, when the level of income per capita
is high, the level of happiness may be higher
when there is no pension system.
4. Life expectancy itself is not always proportional
to the happiness. The extension of lifespan with-
out the income support may not always make our
happiness higher. The extension of lifespan only
accompanied by the income support may make
our happiness higher.
3. The benchmark model
In this section, we have created a utility maximiza-
tion model to analyze the relationship between the life
11
expectancy and the level of happiness, between the in-
come per capita and the level of happiness, and between
the income per capita and the life expectancy which we
have seen in the previous section. We use the lifetime
utility to measure the level of happiness which is an ab-
stract variable. Happiness is not exactly the same with
utility, but both happiness and utility have a positive re-
lationship.6 According to Kimball and Willis (2006),
Jeremy Bentham’s (1781) first definition of “utility”
made the equation of utility and happiness explicit.7 We
assume that both happiness and utility have a close rela-
tionship and the higher the utility level is, the higher the
happiness level is.
3.1. Setting
We consider an individual’s utility maximization
problem under the finite period. He/She can live up to
T years old and die at the age of T . There is no un-
certainty in the model and individuals have perfect fore-
sight. An individual maximizes his/her lifetime utility
which is aected by consumption. The instantaneous
utility function (u()) is specified in log form as follows:
u(c) = ln c (18)
where c is consumption. We think that it is possible to
extend the lifespan by the eorts of the individual. We
assume that there is a linear relationship between health
investment and the lifespan as follows
T = a + bz; (a > 0; b > 0) (19)
where T and z are the lifespan and the health investment,
respectively. And a and b are positive constants. When z
is decided, T is automatically decided, on the contrary,
when T is decided, z is automatically decided, which
means if we invest amount of z, we can live until T and
if we want to live until T , we should invest amount of
z. If an individual invests for his/her health more, as the
result, his/her lifespan will be longer. We assume that
the health investments do not aect the utility directly.8
We also assume that the interest earning is the only
source of income of the individual. And to simplify, a
small open country is assumed, then the domestic inter-
est rate is always constant. We denote the individual’s
asset as x, then his/her budget constraint is written as
follows:
x˙ = rx   c   z (20)
where r is interest rate. We put the initial asset which
the individual has as x(0) = x0.
The individual’s utility maximization problem can
be written as follows:
max
c(t);z
Z T
0
e t ln c(t) dt; (0 <  < 1)
s:t x˙(t) = rx(t)   c(t)   z;
T = a + bz;
x(0) = x0
(21)
where  is discount rate. We assume the  is constant,
that is, this model is a exponential discounting model,
not a hyperbolic discounting model which is treated in
behavioral economics. We assume r  .9 For simpli-
fication, we assume that z has a constant value from the
initial period until T period, z(0) =    = z(T ) = z, and
that z is decided at the initial period. Life expectancy
is the number of years a person can expect to live in
given social environments when he/she is born. We as-
sume that when an individual is born, he/she decides
how much he/she invests for his/her health and how
long he/she lives in the social environments surround-
ing him/her which are x0, a, b, r, , etc.
3.2. Solving the Model
The maximization problem is solved in two stages.
At the first stage, we consider that T and z in Eq. (19)
are given values, not control variables. At the second
6For example, utility is a reflection of people’s choices and happiness is a reflection of people’s feelings.
7Kimball and Willis (2006) mentioned that in the existing literature attempting to link utility and happiness, the dominant explicit or implicit
hypothesis is that current felt happiness is equal to flow utility. Kahneman (1999), Gruber and Mullainathan (2002), Frey and Stutzer (2004), and
Layard (2005) are some of the most explicit in equating happiness and flow utility.
8We can divide consumption c into two categories which are the general consumption cG and the consumption for health improvement cH . It is
unclear whether the direct eect of the latter cH on the utility of individual is positive or negative or neutral. For examples, there might be a person
who takes wheatgrass powder for his/her health maintenance even though it is unpalatable, while on the other side, there might be a person who
takes it with the thinking that it is delicious. Also, there might be a person who commutes to the gym for his/her health maintenance though it is
painful, while on the other side, there might be a person who goes happily to the gym. Nutritional supplements are beneficial for health but are not
delicious or tasteless. Therefore, we can assume that the consumption for health improvement cH is neutral to the individual’s utility and only the
general consumption cG aects the individual’s utility. This means @v(c
G ;cH )
@cG
> 0 and @v(c
G ;cH )
@cH
= 0, so v(cG ; cH) = u(cG).
9If r = , there is no transitional path, because the jump from the initial state up to the terminal state occurs. If r < , there is an overshooting,
the amount of his/her asset accumulation turns back to the terminal state and has a negative growth rate. We do not consider the negative growth in
this research.
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stage, we consider the T and z as control variables. First,
we maximize over c and x for any given T and z, and
then the objective function which has been maximized
with respect to c and x could be described as a function
of T and z. Second, we maximize over T and z instead
of c and x, because c and x have been maximized in the
first stage, that means c and x are a functions of time t,
i.e., c(tjT; z) and x(tjT; z).
3.2.1. The First Stage
We use the Hamiltonian method to solve the max-
imization problem. The Hamiltonian is written as fol-
lows:
H = ln c + (rx   c   z) (22)
By dierentiating Eq. (22) with respect to c and x, we
can get Eq. (23) and Eq. (24).
@H
@c
=
1
c
   = 0 ) c =  1; (23)
@H
@x
=    ˙ = r ) ˙

=    r: (24)
We integrate Eq. (24) to time t, then we get
ln  = (   r)t + k (25)
where k is a constant of integration. Taking exponential
both sides of Eq. (25), then we can get
 = C1e( r)t (26)
where C1 = ek. Substituting Eqs. (23) and (26) into Eq.
(20), we obtain the following
x˙   rx + z =  C 11 e tert: (27)
This dierential equation is solved as follows,
x =
1
C1
e t   1


ert +C2ert +
z
r
(28)
where C2 is a constant. See Appendix A.1 for the de-
tailed calculation. C1 and C2 can be obtained from sub-
stituting the initial condition and transversality condi-
tion. Because of x(0) = x0, we get C2 as follows,
C2 = x0   z
r
: (29)
To maximize his/her utility, when dying, he/she uses up
all his/her assets and leaves nothing. In other words,
x(T ) = 0. We get C1 as follows,
C1 =
1

1   e T
x0   (1   e rT ) zr
: (30)
Substituting Eqs. (29) and (30) into Eq. (28), we obtain
the following
x(t) = x0   (1   e
 rT ) z
r
1   e T (e
 t   1)ert
+ (x0   z
r
)ert + z
r
:
(31)
Substituting Eq. (26) into Eq. (23), we can get
c(t) =  x0   (1   e
 rT ) z
r
1   e T e
(r )t: (32)
Eqs. (31) and (32) are the optimal paths of x and c, re-
spectively, in the situation where the variables T and z
are fixed.
3.2.2. The Second Stage
In the second stage, to maximize his/her lifetime
utility, the individual considers Eq. (19) by choosing
his/her optimal T . We can rewrite the utility maximiza-
tion problem as follows:
max
T
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1   e rT ) zr
1   e T e
(r )t dt
s:t T = a + bz
(33)
We solve the integral in Eq. (33), then we can induce
Eq. (34)Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1   e rT ) zr
1   e T e
(r )t dt
=   ln


x0   (1   e rT ) zr
1   e T
e T   1


  (r   )
 (T + 1)e T   1
2

(34)
See Appendix A.2 for the detailed calculation. Substi-
tuting Eq. (19) into Eq. (34), The maximization prob-
lem can be rewritten as Eq. (35) which has no integral
and has only one control variable T . Eq. (35) is just a
static maximization problem, not a dynamic problem.
max
T
ln


x0   (1   e rT ) T arb
1   e T
1   e T


+ (r   )
1   (T + 1)e T
2
 (35)
We take the derivative of Eq. (35) with respect to T and
set the first derivative to zero as follows,
e T ln


x0   (1   e rT ) T abr
1   e T

 1   e
 T
b
e rT (T   a) + (1   e rT ) 1
r
x0   (1   e rT ) T abr
 e T + (r   )Te T = 0
(36)
13
Eq. (36) is an implicit function as f (x0;T ja; b; r; ) = 0
which is highly non-linear, so it is dicult to solve it
analytically.
4. Pension system in case of lifetime certainty
One of the purposes of this research is to analyze the
eect of the pension system on the maximized utility.
We compare the maximized utility with the constraint
by compulsory saving such as a pension system and the
maximized utility without the constraint. We know that
if other things are constant (ceteris paribus), less con-
strained individual is generally happier than more con-
strained individual. In the following sections, 4 and 5,
we will deal with two pension models that include, life-
time certainty model and lifetime uncertainty model, re-
spectively. In section 4, due to certainty, pension does
not have a funtion of insurance which is a main function
of pension. In section 5, we will introduce an uncer-
tainty to add the function of insurance.
4.1. Lifetime certainty model
Individuals will live until the T and will die at the T
with certainty.
4.1.1. Setup
We introduce a pension system into the benchmark
model additionally. He/She pays a pension p from 0
to s period and gets a pension q after s period to death.
The government decides about p, q and s which are con-
stants as given to individuals. This pension system per-
forms as a compulsory saving for individuals. The time
from 0 to s is named as young period, while the time af-
ter s is named as old period. His/Her budget constraint
in the benchmark model Eq. (20) is changed to Eq. (37).
x˙ =
8>><>>:rx   c   z   p; if 0  t  s (young period)rx   c   z + q; if s < t  T (old period):
(37)
The way to solve the model with this pension system is
similar to that of the benchmark model even though we
have to divide it into young period and old period. Eq.
(28) is changed as follows
x =
8>>><>>>:
1
CY1

e t 1


ert +CY2 e
rt +
z+p
r
; if 0  t  s
1
CO1

e t 1


ert +CO2 e
rt +
z q
r
; if s < t  T:
(38)
where, CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 are constants of integration
which are as follows:
CY1 =
1

1   e s
x0   (1   e rs) z+pr   x(s)e rs
(39)
CY2 = x0  
z + p
r
(40)
CO1 =
1

(e T   e s)ers
z q
r
(1   er(s T ))   x(s) (41)
CO2 =
z q
r
(1   er(s T ))   x(s)
(e T   e s)ers (1 e
 T )  z   q
r
e rT (42)
where, x(s) is interpreted as both the terminal value of
young period and the initial value of old period at the
same time. By the same way as the previous, Eq. (32)
is changed as follows
c(t) =
8>>><>>>:
1
CY1
e(r )t; if 0  t  s
1
CO1
e(r )t; if s < t  T: (43)
Substituting Eq. (43) into the utility function, we have
obtained the following
Z s
0
e t ln
 1
CY1
e(r )t

dt +
Z T
s
e t ln
 1
CO1
e(r )t

dt
(44)
We integrate Eq. (44) to time t, then we have gotten
ln
 1
CY1
1   e s

+ ln
 1
CO1
e s   e T

  (r   )
 (T + 1)e T   1
2

:
(45)
There are zs in CY1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 . If we substitute
z = T ab into C
Y
1 , C
Y
2 , C
O
1 and C
O
2 , then, the original
dynamic optimization problem with the pension system
becomes static optimization problem with respect to T
and x(s) as seen in Eq. (46). In other words, all he/she
has to do is to decide his/her own life expectancy and
the initial asset at the old period.
max
T;x(s)
U
 
T; x(s) = ln 1
CY1
 
T; x(s) 1   e s
+ ln
 1
CO1
 
T; x(s) e s   e T
  (r   )
 (T + 1)e T   1
2

(46)
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4.1.2. Population structure and government budget
We assume that a certain number of people with
endowment x0 is born in every period. Even though
time will go, in the economy, the number of popula-
tion will be the same and the population structure will
not change, because we have assumed a, b, r,  are con-
stants, that is, the social environments surrounding in-
dividuals do not change over time.10 To simplify, we
assume that there is no production division. Because
the individuals are born with same endowment, the op-
timized T s, which the individuals choose, are also same.
At a t period, the distribution of population structure is
a uniform distribution from 0 year old to T year old as
seen in Fig. 6.11 To be precise, it is dicult to divide the
period into t and t+1, because we consider a continuous
time.
The period-by-period budget constraints of govern-
ment are given as follows,
sp = (T   s)q: (47)
The government collects p from each individual be-
tween the age of 0 and s and gives q to each individual
between the age of s and T . It can be a pay-as-you-go
pension system. Because the population structure does
not change, the government’s budget constraint holds
Eq. (47) in every period.
4.2. The unbalanced budget in case of lifetime certainty
First, we consider about unbalanced budget, in other
words, the government can be free to make decisions
about p, q and s without any constraint. It is an unre-
alistic assumption. Only few countries, which are rich
in natural resources and are carefree about their gov-
ernment resources, for example, oil product countries,
may do it. In the following section, we consider about
the balanced budget, i.e., government budget constraint,
that can be found in most of the countries in the world.
Taking the derivative of Eq. (46) with respect to T
and x(s), and setting each first derivatives to zero, and
solving the system of equations, we could obtain the
optimal T  and x(s). Since the profit function of Eq.
(46) is highly non-linear and nested structure, it is very
dicult to get an exact analytical solution for this prob-
lem. The alternative option is to provide the solutions
numerically. The suitable parameter values are used for
the calculation, though they are arbitrary. The param-
eter values that we use to calculate are the following:
a = 20, b = 10, x0 = 100,  = 0:01, r = 0:02. In or-
der to investigate the eects of only the pension system,
not including the eect of income, we put the initial in-
come as the constant value. And we have controlled
the parameters for pension system i.e., p, q and s which
are the amount of payment for pension, the amount of
pension gratuity and the period of payment for pension,
respectively. To show the eects of p, q and s on the
life expectancy and the lifetime utility, p and q are con-
trolled from 0.0 to 2.0, respectively, and s is controlled
from 0.0 to 20.0.
Because we deal with the three variables, p, q and s,
it is dicult to visualize the three variables at one plane
at the same time. We put one variable fixed and change
the remaining two variables to analyze the eect of the
two variables on the life expectancy, the lifetime utility,
and so on. In Section 4.2.1, we fix s and control p and
q. In Section 4.2.2, we fix q and control p and s. In
Section 4.2.3, we fix p and control q and s.
4.2.1. The case where s is fixed
Each panel in Fig. 7 shows the results as the con-
tour lines. Fig. 7 (1) and Fig. 7 (2) show the results
of the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, re-
spectively, when s is fixed at 10.0 while p and q are
changed. The red lines show the results of the bench-
mark model which has no pension system. In Fig. 7
(1) and Fig. 7 (2), the values on the left-upper side are
high and the values on the right-lower side are low. Un-
der fixed s, when p is small and q is big, the life ex-
pectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
By a combination of p and q, especially, when p is small
and q is big, higher life expectancy and higher lifetime
utility level can be realized compared to the results of
benchmark model.
We have gotten a natural result in Fig. 7 (2) that
if the period of payment for pension is fixed, when in-
dividuals pay smaller amount of money and get bigger
amount of money from his/her pension, his/her lifetime
utility level will be higher (on the left-upper side), oth-
erwise, when individuals pay bigger amount of money
and get smaller amount of money from his/her pension,
his/her lifetime utility level will be lower comparing
to the case of non-existing the pension system (on the
right-lower side). The result accords with intuition.
10As the population ages and fewer babies are born, pension system might cause inequality problem between young generation and old genera-
tion.
11We only consider the unchanged period in population structure, which means the population structure is in the steady state, not in transitional
path.
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Figure 6: Population structure in case of lifetime certainty
In Fig. 7 (3), we present the joint graphs of both
Fig 7 (1) and Fig. 7 (2). Fig. 7 (3) shows that Fig. 7
(1) overlaid Fig. 7 (2). Comparing point “A” and point
“B”, the life expectancy of point “A” is longer than that
of point “B”, however, the lifetime utility level of point
“B” is higher than that of point “A”. It is suggested
that long life does not necessarily improve the lifetime
utility level, that means, to live a short and intensely
happy life can be better than to live a longer but less in-
tensely happy life. We have calculated the dierence of
the present value at time 0 of benefit q and the present
value at time 0 of contribution p using Eq. (48) and have
shown the results in Fig. 7 (4). The contour lines shows
upward curve in p   q plain. We denote the dierence
of both present values as PV. Both the PV contour lines
and the lifetime utility contour lines are similar in the
fact that both of them have positive slopes.
PV =
Z T
s
e rtq dt  
Z s
0
e rt p dt
=
q

 
e rs   e rT    p

 
1   e rs (48)
4.2.2. The case where q is fixed
The readings of Fig. 8 is the same with the readings
of Fig. 7. Fig. 8 (1) and Fig. 8 (2) show the results of
the life expectancy and the lifetime utility level, respec-
tively, when q is fixed at 1.0 while p and s are changed.
The red lines show the results of the benchmark model
which has no pension system. In Fig. 8 (1) and Fig. 8
(2), the values on the left-lower side are high and the
values on the right-upper side are low. Under fixed q,
when p is small and s is short, the life expectancy is
longer and the lifetime utility level is higher. By a com-
bination of s and p, especially, when s is short and p is
small, higher life expectancy and higher lifetime utility
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Figure 7: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where s is fixed
level can be realized compared to the results of bench-
mark model.
We have gotten a natural result in Fig. 8 (2) that if
the amount of pension gratuity is fixed, when individu-
als pay smaller amount of money for a short period of
time, his/her lifetime utility level will be higher (on the
left-lower side), otherwise, when individuals pay big-
ger amount of money for a long period of time, his/her
lifetime utility level will be lower comparing to the case
of non-existing the pension system (on the right-upper
side). The result also accords with intuition.
In Fig. 8 (3), we present the joint graphs of both Fig
8 (1) and Fig. 8 (2). Fig. 8 (3) shows that Fig. 8 (1)
overlaid Fig. 8 (2). Both contour lines draw quite paral-
lel lines. The contour lines in Fig. 8 (4) show downward
curve in s   p plain. Both the PV contour lines and the
lifetime utility contour lines are similar in the fact that
both of them have negative slopes.
4.2.3. The case where p is fixed
The readings of Fig. 9 is the same with the read-
ings of Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. Fig. 9 (1) and Fig. 9 (2)
show the results of the life expectancy and the lifetime
utility level, respectively, when p is fixed at 1.0 while q
and s are changed. The red lines show the results of the
benchmark model which has no pension system. In Fig.
9 (1) and Fig. 9 (2), the values on the right-lower side
are high and the values on the left-upper side are low.
Under fixed p, when q is big and s is short, the life ex-
pectancy is longer and the lifetime utility level is higher.
By a combination of q and s, especially, when q is big
and s is short, higher life expectancy and higher life-
time utility level can be realized compared to the results
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Figure 8: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where q is fixed
of benchmark model.
We have gotten a natural result in Fig. 9 (2) that if
the amount of payment for pension is fixed, when indi-
viduals get bigger amount of money from his/her pen-
sion and pay for a short period of time, his/her lifetime
utility level will be higher (on the right-lower side), oth-
erwise, when individuals get smaller amount of money
from his/her pension and pay for a long period of time,
his/her lifetime utility level will be lower comparing to
the case of non-existing the pension system (on the left-
upper side). The result also accords with intuition.
In Fig. 9 (3), we present the joint graphs of both
Fig 9 (1) and Fig. 9 (2). Fig. 9 (3) shows that Fig. 9
(1) overlaid Fig. 9 (2). Comparing point “A” and point
“B”, the life expectancy of point “A” is longer than that
of point “B”, however, the lifetime utility level of point
“B” is higher than that of point “A”. As it has been
already suggested, to live a short and intensely happy
life can be better than to live a longer and less intensely
happy life, which means that long life does not neces-
sarily improve the lifetime utility level. The contour
lines in Fig. 9 (4) show downward curve in q   s plain.
Both the PV contour lines and the lifetime utility con-
tour lines are similar in the fact that both of them have
positive slopes.
4.2.4. Grid search
We have gotten several natural results using the dy-
namic utility maximization problem. The results are
that when p is small, when q is big, and when s is
short, that is, when an individual pays a small amount of
money for a short period of time and gets a big amount
of money from his/her pension, the lifetime utility level
18
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Figure 9: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where p is fixed
is higher. The increase in lifetime utility is hardly aston-
ishing because the lifetime budget constraint of individ-
uals increases when individuals receive more benefits
from the pension system for which they do not have to
pay so much. These results accord with intuition.
We will show the relationship among the life ex-
pectancy, the lifetime utility and the pension system
through the combination of p, q and s and we will com-
pare them with the results from the cross-country data
in the Section 2.
Fig. 10 plots the relationship between the life ex-
pectancy and the lifetime utility level. By changing of
the parameters for pension system, p, q and s, which
are the amount of payment for pension, the amount of
pension gratuity and the period of payment for pen-
sion, respectively, we have gotten the pairs of the life
expectancy and the lifetime utility. We have used the
grid search to show the pairs. In using the grid search,
we have to decide the range of three variables and
the number of grids in advance. We choose an eq-
uispaced grid fp1;    ; png = f0:01;    ; 1:91g for the
amount of payment for pension p with n = 20 nodes
and fq1;    ; qng = f0:05;    ; 1:95g for the amount of
pension gratuity q with n = 20 nodes. For the period
of payment for pension s, we also choose an equispaced
grid fs1;    ; sng = f0:01;    ; 19:01g with n = 20 nodes.
12The figures of the life expectancy tell nothing about the relative length of life expectancy. As the concept of the ordinal utility, the dierences
in the figures of the life expectancy are treated as meaningless. The figures do not mean the number of years.
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Figure 10: Comparison of case with pension system and case without pension system
The number of combinations of three variables p, q and
s is 8,000. In Fig. 10, the horizontal line and the verti-
cal line show the life expectancy and the lifetime utility
level, respectively.12
In Fig. 10, there are 8,000 dots which are the results
of grid search and there is one dot which is point A (LE,
LU)=(24.556, 33.742) which shows the pair of the life
expectancy and the lifetime utility level obtained from
the benchmark model which has no pension system. All
of these dots except the point A show the pairs when the
pension system exists. We draw a vertical and horizon-
tal line from the point A and divide the plain into 4 areas.
In area I, the life expectancy is longer and the lifetime
utility level is higher compared to the point A. In area
II, the life expectancy is longer but the lifetime utility
level is lower compared to the point A. In area III, the
life expectancy is shorter and the lifetime utility level is
lower compared to the point A. There is no pair in area
IV.
The life expectancy is not always proportional to the
lifetime utility level. When we compare any dot in the
area II and the point A, even though the life expectancy
of the dot in the area II is longer, its lifetime utility level
is lower. Also, the pension system can make life ex-
pectancy longer or shorter and can make lifetime utility
level higher or lower. If we get big amounts of pension
in the future, the life expectancy can be extended and
the lifetime utility can go up. It is the most preferable,
however, in today’s reality, we cannot expect that the
amount of the pension will increase due to the problem
of financial resources.
The pension system could also lead to some kind of
infirmity as follows: 1) Even though the life expectancy
is extended, the lifetime utility level can go down. This
is the case when he/she is forced to pay his/her pension,
he/she chooses a dot in the area II, instead of the the
20
point A which is the best choice for individuals in case
without pension system. Because of that an individual is
forced to pay the pension during his/her young period,
the pension system leads to less personal consumption
in his/her young period. Even though he/she tries to
prolong his/her life for a long time to get his/her money
back which he/she paid mandatorily, his/her lifetime
utility level can go down compared to the case without
pension system. Even though rising longevity is incited
by the pension system, the years they gain in life ex-
pectancy may not be healthy ones, so the increase in life
expectancy requires more savings for health-care spend-
ing in his/her old age and less consumption through
his/her whole life. It is also confirmed from the data in
the Section 2 that the increase in life expectancy with-
out an increase in income does not aect too much their
happiness. 2) The life expectancy is decreased, more-
over, the lifetime utility level can go down. This is the
worst scenario. This is the case when he/she is forced
to pay his/her pension, he/she chooses a dot in the area
III, instead of the point A which is the best choice for in-
dividuals in case without pension system. He/She does
not have enough money to invest for his/her health care
because most of his/her money is paid for his/her pen-
sion. As an extreme example, we can take an individual
who can choose a short life to refuse to pay the pension
until such period s and to increase his/her consumption
in his/her young period.13
4.3. The balanced budget in case of lifetime certainty
In the previous section, we have analyzed the rela-
tionship among the life expectancy, the lifetime utility
and the pension system under the unbalanced budget of
government which was an unrealistic assumption. From
now on, we will analyze the relationship under the bal-
anced budget of government. Under the budget con-
straint, the degree of freedom which the government can
choose decreases by one. The government can only de-
cide two variables among the three variables, p, q and
s. We can explain it in the following order. In Sec-
tion 4.3.1, the government decides about the two vari-
ables p and q while s is given by the budget constraint
of government. In the Section 4.3.2, the government de-
cides about the two variables s and p while q is given by
the budget constraint of government. In Section 4.3.3,
the government decides about the two variables q and
s while p is given by the budget constraint of govern-
ment. We will use the same values of parameter used in
the Section 4.2, that is, p and q are controlled from 0.0
to 2.0, respectively, and s is controlled from 0.0 to 20.0.
4.3.1. The case where p and q are controlled
When p and q are controlled, s can be obtained from
Eq. (49).
s =
Tq
p + q
(49)
Fig. 11 (1) and Fig. 11 (2) show the results of the
life expectancy and the lifetime utility level while p and
q are changed under the government budget constraint,
respectively. Fig. 11 (3) shows s when p and q are
given. Fig. 11 (4) shows the PV, which is the dierence
of the present values of contribution p and the present
values of benefit q, that is also calculated in the Section
4.2. Fig. 11 (1), (2), (3) and (4) show a blank portion on
the left-upper area where the government budget con-
straint does not hold Eq. (49).14
From Fig. 11 (1), the life expectancy far from the
point of origin (0,0) is longer comparing to the life ex-
pectancy near to the point of origin, that means the pen-
sion system makes the life expectancy extended, how-
ever, from Fig. 11 (2), the lifetime utility level at the
point of origin is the highest, that is, it is impossible
that the pension system makes the lifetime utility level
higher under the government budget constraint. From
Fig. 11 (1) and Fig. 11 (2), we know that when the life
expectancy is short, the utility is higher and that even
though the pension system makes the life expectancy
longer, it does not make the lifetime utility level higher
under the budget constraint. We can guess the reason
why in order to make T longer, s also has to be longer
to hold the budget constraint. From Fig. 11 (4), we
know that by a combination of p and q under the budget
constraint, the PV cannot be positive.
4.3.2. The case where s and p are controlled
When s and p are controlled, q can be obtained from
Eq. (50).
q =
sp
T   s (50)
Fig. 12 (1) and Fig. 12 (2) show the results of the
life expectancy and the lifetime utility level while s and
13There was an accident reported in South Korea in 2005, where a person, who was against the compulsory pension system and who was in
arrears with his pension, took away his life. It is a case of the tail wagging the dog.
14The government budget constraint does not always hold Eq. (49), because individuals decide T based on p, q and s. To describe Eq. (49) more
accurately, s = T (p;q;s)qp+q .
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Figure 11: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where p and q are controlled
p are changed under the government budget constraint,
respectively. Fig. 12 (3) shows q when s and p are
given. Fig. 12 (4) shows the PV. The upper-right areas
are the areas where the government budget constraint
does not hold Eq. (50).
We have gotten the same results, as in the case
where p and q are controlled at the previous section, that
from Fig. 12 (1), the further from the point of origin, the
life expectancy is longer, however, from Fig. 12 (2), the
further from the point of origin, the lower lifetime utility
level is and the nearer to the point of origin, the higher
lifetime utility level is. Even though the pension system
makes the life expectancy longer, it does not make the
lifetime utility level higher under the budget constraint.
From Fig. 12 (4), we know that by a combination of
s and p under the budget constraint, the PV cannot be
positive.
4.3.3. The case where q and s are controlled
When q and s are controlled, p can be obtained from
Eq. (51).
p = q
T   s
s

(51)
Fig. 13 (1) and Fig. 13 (2) show the results of the
life expectancy and the lifetime utility level while s and
p are changed under the government budget constraint,
respectively. Fig. 13 (3) shows p when q and s are
given. Fig. 13 (4) shows the PV. The lower-right areas
are the areas where the government budget constraint
does not hold Eq. (51).
We have gotten the same results as in the both previ-
ous cases, the shorter life expectancy, the higher lifetime
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Figure 12: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where s and p are controlled
utility level is and that even though the pension system
makes the life expectancy longer, it does not make life-
time utility level higher under the budget constraint. In
Fig. 13 (2), if s is same, when q is small, the lifetime
utility level is high. Although this may sound strange,
because when q is small, p also should be small to hold
the budget constraint. That can be confirmed from the
PV in Fig. 13 (4).
4.3.4. Grid search
We have plotted the relationship between the life ex-
pectancy and the lifetime utility level under the unbal-
anced budget of government in Fig. 10 in the previous
section. We have divided the dots into five areas, which
are area i, area ii, area iii, area iv and area v, by the gov-
ernment budget constraint, the lifetime utility level and
the life expectancy as follows,
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
area i; if sp < (T   s)q and Lifetime utility > LU
area ii; if sp < (T   s)q and Lifetime utility < LU
area iii; if sp = (T   s)q
area iv; if sp > (T   s)q and Life expectancy > LE
area v; if sp > (T   s)q and Life expectancy < LE
(52)
Fig. 14 shows the results. In the area i and ii, the
government revenue is less than the government expen-
diture for the pension. The area i and ii are unfeasible
areas if there is no additional financial resources. The
government should replenish the underfunded revenue
by another way to meet the deficit budget e.g., raising
tax or issuance of government bonds or sellout the natu-
ral resources, etc. The area iii, iv and v are feasible areas
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Figure 13: Life expectancy and lifetime utility level – the case where q and s are controlled
even if there is no additional financial resources. In the
area iii, the government executes the balanced budget.
In the area iv and v, the government expenditure for the
pension is less than the government revenue. If pension
system has any ineciency which is liable to happen,
the areas, iv and v, are possible.
From the area iii, we know that when the govern-
ment holds the budget constraint, the lifetime utility
level can not increase even though the life expectancy
can prolong. In the area ii, when the government ex-
penditures for pension are higher than the government
revenues, even though the life expectancy increases, the
lifetime utility goes down. On the contrary, in the area
iv, when the government expenditures for pension are
lower than the government revenues, even though the
lifetime utility goes down, the life expectancy prolongs.
Individuals know that if they live longer they will get
more pension. They are motivated to live longer as it
is the only way they could enjoy the pension they have
been paying for a long time.
From these results, we can say that life expectancy
can be longer when pension system exists, not only
when the government has enough revenue but also when
the government hardly has enough revenue, depending
on how the government operates the pension system.
5. Pension system in case of lifetime uncertainty
Generally, we are prone to think that we have more
need for a pension system in case that we do not know,
due to uncertainty, when we will die exactly. In Section
5, we consider an uncertainty in lifetime.
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Figure 14: Five areas divided by life expectancy and lifetime utility level
5.1. Lifetime uncertainty model
We introduce an uncertainty in the T which individ-
ual chooses to maximize his/her lifetime utility. We add
an uncertainty to Eq. (19).
T = a + bz +  (53)
where,  is a random variable with E() = 0 and sym-
metric distribution with respect to the mean,     
, where  is a positive constant. When  is positive,
an individual lives longer than the planned period T and
when  is negative, an individual dies earlier than the
planned period T . a + bz     T  a + bz + .
Because E() = 0, the expected longevity is E(T ) =
a + bz. And the distributions of population by age look
like Fig. 15 at any t period. Someone dies before T -
year-old and someone continues to live more than T .
If there are lots of individuals in economy, the number
of individuals who continue to live more than T will be
equal to the number of individuals who die before T , be-
cause the random variable  is symmetric with respect
to zero. The amount of pension which is paid to the in-
dividual T years of age or older can be covered from the
amount of pension which is collected from the individ-
uals who die younger than T . By law of large numbers,
the budget constraint is no dierent from the one in the
case of lifetime certainty in the previous section as Eq.
(47).
We will compare Case I in which the individual
saves an extra money by himself/herself for the ex-
tended period from T to T +  when he/she will be still
alive unexpectedly and Case II in which the individual
gets the benefit of the pension that has been analyzed in
the previous section. If the individual is still alive and
does not have money after period T which he/she has
chosen optimally, he/she will have hard time. So, we
assume that first, the individual chooses the T optimally
15There are many dierent ways to express the lifetime uncertainty problem, for example, we can model the uncertainty problem as follows,
max E(U) =
R 1
 1 U
 
cj f () d, where f () means probability density function. However, this assumption makes the uncertainty problem very
simple. We do not need to specify about the distribution of random variable , etc.
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Figure 15: Population structure in case of lifetime uncertainty
and then he/she maximizes his/her lifetime utility with
respect to T +  considering the case that he/she will be
still alive until T + . 15 The individual’s utility maxi-
mization problem can be written as follows:
max
c(t)
Z T +
0
e t ln c(t) dt (54)
where T  is the optimized T in the Section 3.
5.2. Results
Fig. 16 shows that the green line, which shows the
result of Case I, is added on Fig. 14 in the Section 4.3.4.
The green line is located above the area iii which means
the lifetime utility level of the Case I is higher than that
of the Case II. Even though individual chooses T + as
a second best instead of T  and saves his/her money for
unexpected lifespan gain, his/her lifetime utility level is
higher comparing to the case of existing the pension sys-
tem. If the prediction of lifespan is completely wrong
under lifetime uncertainty like point B which means 
is very big, the pension system will improve the lifetime
utility level. The extended line “–?–” from the area iii
to the point B is drawn approximately but not exactly to
show the area to hold the government budget constraint.
Even if the uncertainty has been introduced in this
research model, the same conclusion could be reached,
because the core of this problem is the existence or non-
existence of the compulsory pension system which pre-
vents the lifetime utility from maximizing. The exis-
tence of uncertainty is not of the essence in this research
model.
6. Conclusion
This research has analyzed the eect of a pension
system on life expectancy and happiness level using
a cross country data and an optimal dynamic problem
of individuals who live in continuous and finite time.
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Figure 16: Comparison of case with pension system and case without pension system
There are many studies which have analyzed the eect
of rising longevity on pension system, but few stud-
ies have analyzed the opposite direction eect, which
means how the pension system aects to the rising
longevity. This is a contribution of this research.
We have gotten several interesting but radical results
using the data and the optimization problem. Income
per capita can almost explain happiness and the lifes-
pan does not have much influence on happiness. There-
fore, life expectancy itself is not always proportional to
the happiness. The survival itself is not always making
our happiness higher. The extension of lifespan only
accompanied by the income support may make our hap-
piness higher. Becker et al. (2005) mentions that life
expectancy gains have been an important component of
improvements in welfare, but that may be the case in the
situation where their financial problems can be resolved.
Pension system can make lifespan longer or shorter
and can raise or reduce the level of happiness, depend-
ing on income per capita and the type of pension system.
Especially, under government budget constraint, even
though pension system can make the lifespan longer,
pension system cannot make the happiness level higher.
If there is a pension system, we will try to live longer to
get more pension, however, the public pension system,
which is a compulsory saving, can crowd out the private
savings and can prevent individual’s utility maximiza-
tion. Even though there is an uncertainty in lifetime,
unless the prediction of lifespan turns out to be com-
pletely wrong, there is a small possibility that the pen-
sion system will improve the happiness level. The pen-
sion system can rather raise problems for aging popula-
tion which aect the country’s productivity and growth
rate through the decline in the fraction of working-age
population.
When the level of income per capita is low, the pen-
sion system can make the happiness higher, on the con-
trary, when the level of income per capita is high, the
level of happiness may be higher when there is no pen-
sion system. It may be necessary to reconsider about
the reason for existence of the compulsory pension sys-
tem which has been a considerable economic and social
burden on young generations.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Eq. (28)
Let us put B =  C 11 . Multiplying both sides of Eq.
(27) by e rt and integrating to time t, we get the follow-
ing
(x˙   rx + z)e rt = Be t
xe rt   z
r
e rt + D1 =  Be
 t

+ D2
(A1)
where D1 and D2 are constants of integration. Eq. (A1)
can be arranged as follows
xe rt   z
r
e rt =  Be
 t

+ B
1

+C2
x   z
r

e rt =  B
e t   1


+C2
(A2)
where C2 = D2 D1 B 1 . Multiplying both sides of Eq.
(A2) by e rt and substituting B =  C 11 into Eq. (A2),
Eq. (A2) can be arranged as Eq. (28).
A.2 Derivation of Eq. (34)
Let us put A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

.
Z T
0
e t ln


x0   (1   e rT ) zr
1   e T e
(r )t dt
=
Z T
0

Ae t + (r   )te t dt
=A
Z T
0
e t dt + (r   )
Z T
0
te t dt
=A
h
 e
 t

iT
0
  (r   )
h (t + 1)e t
2
iT
0
=   A
e T   1


  (r   )
 (T + 1)e T   1
2

(A3)
Substituting A = ln


x0 (1 e rT ) zr
1 e T

into Eq. (A3), Eq.
(A3) can be arranged as Eq. (34).
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